

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**DEFENDING AGAINST TERRORISM –
IS IT BANKRUPTING AMERICA?**

by

Mr. Donald W. Grosz
G3, USAREUR

Dr. Antulio Echevarria
Project Advisor

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 18 MAR 2005		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Defending Against Terrorism Is It Bankrupting America?				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Donald Grosz				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 31	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Mr. Donald W. Grosz

TITLE: Defending Against Terrorism – Is it Bankrupting America?

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 18 March 2005 PAGES: 29 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

In a videotaped message aired by Al-Jeezera in late October, 2004, Osama bin Laden stated, "We are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy."

Will the United States' efforts to secure its homeland cause bankruptcy? What is our strategy? Is it sound? What is it costing the American taxpayer? Can we afford it?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
DEFENDING AGAINST TERRORISM – IS IT BANKRUPTING AMERICA?	1
THE GWOT: WHO IS FIGHTING IT AND WHAT ARE THE COSTS?	2
WHAT IS OUR CURRENT GWOT STRATEGY, AND WHAT SHOULD BE ITS	
ATTRIBUTES?.....	5
IS OUR GWOT STRATEGY SOUND?	6
BUT IN TERMS OF THE U.S. FISCAL WELL BEING, ARE THE COSTS OF OUR	
CURRENT GWOT STRATEGY CAUSE FOR ALARM?	9
IS CURRENT GWOT FUNDING ADEQUATE, OR IS ADDITIONAL FUNDING	
NECESSARY?	11
CONCLUSION.	12
ENDNOTES	15
BIBLIOGRAPHY	23

DEFENDING AGAINST TERRORISM – IS IT BANKRUPTING AMERICA?

The savage events of September 11th, 2001 (9/11) awakened Americans to the realization of the persistency and lengths to which extremist Islamic terrorists are willing to go and the horrendous deeds they are willing to commit in quest of their strategic goals. “Al Qaeda did not attack the United States simply to kill Americans. Al Qaeda wanted to kill Americans in order to achieve a political goal: the recreation of at least part of the caliphate, an empire ruled by Islamic law in the first millennium AD and feared and respected by the rest of the world.”¹ “Al Qaeda’s overall objectives are to (1) expel the US from the Arabian peninsula, the Persian Gulf and all other Islamic lands; (2) end the suffering and repression of Muslims throughout the world; (3) topple every ruling regime in the Islamic world and install a government based upon the sharia,² and (4) unite the lands of Islam under the Caliph and incorporate the lands of the unbelievers into the fold of Islam.”³ To achieve its goals, al Qaeda “sees violence as both acceptable and necessary, and draws no distinction between military and civilian targets for this violence.”⁴

As to America, I say to it and its people a few words: I swear to God that America will not live in peace before peace reigns in Palestine, and before all the army of the infidels depart the land of Mohammed, peace be upon him.

? Osama bin Laden: videotaped statement on 7 OCT 2001

While some recent, fragile progress has been noted, peace in Palestine is still not in sight. Even the most conservative estimates retain U.S. forces in the Middle East well into the future, with a minimum of 5-10 years in Iraq alone, and our strategic interests in that region will not wane anytime in the foreseeable future. As the recently published 9/11 Commission Report states, (This) “is not a position with which Americans can bargain or negotiate. With it there is no common ground – not even respect for life – on which to begin a dialogue. It can only be destroyed or utterly isolated.”⁵ Since meeting the terrorists’ terms is totally unacceptable, our only alternative is to employ all possible measures to prevent terrorists from successfully executing future attacks, and to be prepared to minimize the damage and hasten the recovery from the effects of another one.

Not surprisingly, federal funding for homeland security has increased steadily and substantially since the September 11th attacks. In the first few months immediately following 9/11, over \$20 billion was applied to enhance homeland security, including funds to upgrade intelligence and security, provide recovery assistance to disaster sites, help victims’ families,

and increase the number of law enforcement personnel. New airline security standards were implemented to tighten background checks for airline screeners and workers, expand the federal air marshal program, create new baggage security requirements, and tighten security in all airports. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has enhanced the food screening process of imported foods. The Department of Health and Human Services created the Office of Public Health Preparedness to coordinate the national response to public health emergencies.⁶ But most sources acknowledge the U.S. is still precariously vulnerable to future attacks, and that much, much more remains to be done.

During the last half of the twentieth century, America led the struggle of the free world to contain and ultimately cause the downfall of communism and the Soviet Union. Today, our multi-front Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT, has replaced the Cold War as our most significant struggle against an ideology and foreign adversary. Where defeating the “Evil Empire” provided the major focus of our National Security efforts and expenditures, defeating terrorism, especially extremist Islamic terrorism, has gained a prominent place in our National Security Strategy and in our national budget. Defeating terrorism as a threat to our very existence is not unlike our Cold War goal that necessitated our costly containment strategy. Isolating the ideology of Islamic terrorists, as the 9/11 Commission recommended, and containing communism are indeed an endeavor of similar if not equal significance. In their April 2004 report, the House of Representatives Select Committee on Homeland Security recognized that “...we are at war with a brand of radical Islamic fundamentalism that is extremely dangerous, is growing, and is a true threat to our people, our economy, and our way of life. Let us be clear – this is a war for nothing less than our survival.”⁷

THE GWOT: WHO IS FIGHTING IT AND WHAT ARE THE COSTS?

The two federal departments charged with the bulk of prosecuting the GWOT are the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review states that homeland defense is the Pentagon's primary mission,⁸ the bulk of DOD's efforts are primarily focused on offensively engaging the threat at its source: overseas, e.g., Afghanistan and Iraq. Because of such limitations as *Posse Comitatus*⁹, DOD's efforts are not conducted within U.S borders except in response to an emergency. The Department of Defense actually has two roles to play in providing for the security of the American people where they live and work. The first is to provide forces to conduct those traditional military missions under extraordinary circumstances, such as the defense of the nation's airspace or its maritime approaches. The second is to support the broader efforts of

the federal domestic departments and agencies and indeed the state and local government, as coordinated by and in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security under emergency conditions for special purposes.

With respect to DOD's second role, USNORTHCOM's mission is homeland defense and civil support, specifically:

- Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility; and
- As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) including consequence management operations.

NORTHCOM also coordinates military support to federal, state and local governments in the event of natural or other disasters. This includes the deployment of soldiers to assist in evacuation; the provision of transportation or medical facilities and supplies; or communications equipment.¹⁰

While NORTHCOM is devoted to defending the people and territory of the United States against external threats and to coordinating the provision of U.S. military forces to support civil authorities, it must be understood that NORTHCOM is only a headquarters – it has no organic military combat forces assigned. In order to provide the necessary military support, NORTHCOM must work through the Joint Staff and other DOD entities to identify the military element(s) that will deploy to the site of the emergency (many local arrangements already exist, especially with State National Guards). What this all means is that DOD's military forces are the back-up. State, local and privately hired law enforcement and security forces are the “first line of defense” in U.S. domestic security.

On March 1, 2003, in what has been termed as “one of the boldest and most important steps and the largest government reorganization undertaken since 1947 towards defending our nation,” the U.S. Government merged the majority of 180,000 employees from 22 agencies¹¹ to create the 15th department in the federal government, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Department is comprised of five major divisions or directorates: Border & Transportation Security; Emergency Preparedness & Response; Science & Technology; Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection; and Management. Several other critical agencies, to include the Coast Guard and the Secret Service are folding into the new department or being newly created.¹² With a primary mission to protect the American people from terrorist attack, DHS leverages the resources of more than 87,000 different governmental jurisdictions at the federal, state, and local level, coordinating the transition of these multiple

agencies and programs into a single, integrated agency focused on protecting the American people and their homeland.¹³ DHS focuses on domestic ("homeland") security efforts to deter and defend against terrorist attack and, if necessary, to ensure a capability to provide an effective response that minimizes and contains the effects of the attack, should one occur.

Although DHS is the predominant (in terms of funding) federal agency charged with homeland security, other federal departments are funded for and also contribute to this effort. In their September 2004 report, the GAO identified six federal departments as having key roles in implementing the Homeland Security strategy. These six departments have the highest level of requested funding and together comprise 94 percent of the proposed \$47 billion budget for homeland security in fiscal year 2005. These departments, along with amounts in the 2005 Budget Request specifically earmarked for domestic security are:

- The Department of Homeland Security (\$27.215 billion),
- The Department of Defense (\$8.023 billion),
- The Department of Health and Human Services (\$4.276 billion),
- The Department of Justice (\$2.581 billion),
- The Department of Energy (\$1.497 billion), and
- The Department of State (\$955 million).

Other agencies include the Departments of Agriculture (\$651 million), Veterans Affairs (\$297 million), Transportation (\$243 million), Commerce (\$150 million), and Treasury (\$87 million), as well as the National Science Foundation (\$344 million), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (\$207 million), Social Security Administration (\$155 million), Environmental Protection Agency (\$97 million), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (\$84 million), General Services Administration (\$80 million), and several smaller agencies, all totaling \$2.839M.¹⁴

The FY 2005 budget for all of DOD is estimated at \$448 billion.¹⁵ In addition to the \$8 billion in the DOD budget mentioned above dedicated for homeland security, it has been estimated that an additional \$20 billion in the FY 2005 DOD budget is being consumed by homeland defense efforts.¹⁶ Additionally, since September 2001, Congress has appropriated supplements to the DOD budget totaling \$168 billion, much of which is to enable prosecution of the GWOT, most recently and notably for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. An additional \$75 billion supplement to the FY05 DOD budget is currently pending approval. Thus, using the above budget figures, the total DOD budget for FY 2005 will be \$523 billion (assuming

passage of the supplement), with somewhere between \$28 and \$103 billion (8 +20 + 75) specifically dedicated to the GWOT.

Totaling the DOD budget estimate (\$523 billion) and the homeland security budgets of the other federal agencies (\$39 billion – \$47 billion less DOD's \$8 billion) gives us a close approximation of the current total annual cost for defending America: \$562 billion. While the DOD budget addresses other military capabilities and many other threats to our national security besides terrorism, one should note that total federal domestic funding (\$47 billion) for our GWOT strategy – is less than one-tenth of the total budget for our overall national defense efforts.

WHAT IS OUR CURRENT GWOT STRATEGY, AND WHAT SHOULD BE ITS ATTRIBUTES?

On November 27, 2002, Congress established the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly referred to as the 9/11 Commission, to investigate the relevant facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result of its investigation, the 9/11 Commission issued a report on July 22, 2004, which included 41 primary recommendations for improvements in the United States' approach to securing the homeland and combating terrorism.¹⁷ The Commission also commented on the nature of challenge: "Calling this struggle a war accurately describes the use of American and allied armed forces to find and destroy terrorist groups...The language of war also evokes the mobilization for a national effort. Yet the strategy should be *balanced*." The Commission advocated a "broad political-military strategy that rests on a firm tripod of policies to

- Attack terrorists and their organizations
- Prevent the continued growth of Islamic terrorism; and
- Protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.¹⁸

"We need to design a *balanced* strategy for the long haul, to attack terrorists and prevent their ranks from swelling while at the same time protecting our country against future attacks."¹⁹

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration developed and published a constellation of seven national strategies that relate, in part or in whole, to combating terrorism and homeland security. These were the:

- The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002.²⁰

- The National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002.²¹ The National Strategy forms the cornerstone for our homeland security efforts. It recognizes that these efforts is just “the beginning of what will be a long struggle to protect out Nation from terrorism,” and that “the strategy will be adjusted and amended over time.” It defines homeland security as “a concerted (systematic, comprehensive, and strategic) national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, minimize the damage, and recover from attacks that do occur.”²² This definition recognizes that “as a vibrant and prosperous free society we present an ever-evolving, ever-changing target.” It acknowledges, “As we shore up our defenses in one area, the terrorists may exploit vulnerabilities in others.” It further acknowledges that in order to prevent terrorism from altering the American way of life, “we have to accept some level of risk as a permanent condition,” and that “we must constantly *balance* the benefits of mitigating this risk against both the economic costs and infringements on individual liberty that this mitigation entails.”²³
- The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003.²⁴
- The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002.²⁵
- The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, February 2003.²⁶
- The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February 2003.²⁷
- The 2002 National Money Laundering Strategy, July 2002.²⁸

These seven strategy documents cover a broad range of related topics—from preparing against terrorist attacks to combating weapons of mass destruction, protecting our physical infrastructure, securing cyberspace, and blocking terrorist financing. The new strategies accompany the federal government’s biggest reorganization in more than 50 years to address the new threat environment.²⁹ In essence, they provide the political/military strategy recommended by Congress to attack terrorists and their organizations; prevent the continued growth of Islamic terrorism; and protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks. The strategy has, needless to say, subsequently been the subject of much scrutiny to determine its soundness.

IS OUR GWOT STRATEGY SOUND?

For any national strategy to be sound, i.e., to successfully support any national interest, the goal (ends) of the strategy must be attainable or “in balance” with the resources (means)

and the methods (ways) employed.³⁰ The ends must be suitable, i.e., they must attain the desired effect and satisfy the interest. The ways must be feasible (doable with the means at hand) and acceptable (worth the expenditure of the means to the degree necessary). Often, means and ways are not sufficient to assure total attainment of the ends, thus causing a strategy that is not completely in balance. Some possibility of failure, called risk - some degree of imbalance - may exist. To bring the strategy into its best balance and to reduce the risk as much as possible, the proponents of the strategy must adjust one or more of the three variables.³¹ Either the means must be increased, the ways changed, or the expectations (ends) diminished. The more vital³² the interest, the more willing a proponent must be to apply the necessary means and ways to minimize the risk as much as possible in order to achieve the ends. If some degree of residual risk exists, the proponents must acknowledge it and be willing, short of exhaustion of all ways and means, to accept it – or, change the ends. One can conclude from the 9/11 commission comments cited earlier that defeating terrorism is vital to our national security. Therefore, to minimize the risk of failure, the ends, ways, and means must be as closely ‘balanced’ (recall the 9/11 Commission use of the word) as possible.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) has conducted a number of studies for Congress, analyzing and evaluating several aspects of the GWOT strategy to determine its soundness, i.e., how well it addresses the tripod of policies advocated by the 9/11 Commission. In their report entitled “Observations on the National Strategies Related to Terrorism” issued on 22 September 2004, the GAO concluded that “The national strategies are generally aligned with the 9/11 Commission recommendations;³³ however, they went on to state that “the strategy’s initiatives often do not provide a baseline set of performance goals and measures upon which to assess and improve preparedness. Thus, is it (sic) a challenge for the nation to ensure both a successful and a fiscally responsible preparedness effort.”³⁴ The GAO went on to point out that no comprehensive set of preparedness standards exists for measuring first responder capacities, identifying gaps in those capacities, and measuring progress in achieving performance goals. Additionally, they found that state and local officials were concerned about the lack of specific standards for measuring preparedness, and these officials noted that specific benchmarks would help them determine whether they were adequately prepared to respond to a bioterrorism incident. Moreover, the GAO recommended the establishment of national interoperability performance goals and standards. Finally, they reported on the lack of reliable information on existing federal, state, and local capabilities for combating terrorism and the need to develop a comprehensive inventory of existing capabilities. Without standards linked to such

capabilities, it will be a challenge to assess preparedness gaps and efforts to address the gaps.³⁵

In an earlier study, the GAO similarly concluded that a strategic approach to homeland security must include identifying threats and managing risks, aligning resources to address them, and assessing progress in preparing for those threats and risks. As with other major policy areas, demonstrating the results of homeland security efforts must also include developing and implementing strategies, establishing baselines, developing and implementing performance goals and data quality standards, collecting reliable data, analyzing the data, assessing the results, and taking action based on the results.³⁶

The GAO made a number of strategic recommendations related to combating terrorism and homeland security. In their March 2004 evaluation, the GAO organized 114 strategic recommendations of three Congressionally chartered commissions³⁷ and 59 of their own strategic recommendations into the six “critical mission areas” set forth in the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The highest number of recommendations (46) related to the emergency preparedness and response critical mission area. Defending against catastrophic threats was next with 36 recommendations. Intelligence and warning, critical infrastructure and key asset protection, domestic counterterrorism, and border and transportation security followed with 30, 26, 18, and 17 recommendations, respectively.³⁸

In consonance with the preceding recommendations, the President's 2005 Budget increases funding in each of the six “critical mission areas”. The 2005 breakout is as follows (compared with 2004 appropriations):

- | | |
|---|--|
| • Border and Transportation Security | \$17.075 billion, up from \$15.323 billion |
| • Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets | \$14.06 billion, up from \$12.571 billion |
| • Emergency Preparedness and Response | \$8.802 billion, up from \$7.133 billion |
| • Domestic Counterterrorism | \$3.420 billion, up from \$2.994 billion |
| • Defending Against Catastrophic Threats | \$3.358 billion, up from \$2.827 billion |
| • Intelligence and Warning | \$474.1 million, up from \$268.7 million ³⁹ |

Funding in each of the six areas was increased, improving a wide range of domestic security capabilities. As an example, the \$1.7 billion (23 percent) increase over the 2004 level addressed in the emergency preparedness and response mission area include:

- Establishing measurable goals for national preparedness and ensuring that federal funding supports these goals.
- Ensuring that Federal programs to train and equip States and localities are coordinated and complementary.
- Encouraging standardization and interoperability of first responder equipment, especially for communications.
- Building a national training, exercise, evaluation system.⁴⁰

Thus, the federal government is beginning the process of developing universal standards, implementing a process to assess attainment of those standards and determine what shortfalls exist. Whether this will subsequently identify increased federal funding requirements remains to be seen, but at least the U.S. domestic security program is on a sound path that identifies shortfalls, assesses progress in preparing for threats, and determines what resources are needed to address them. In other words, a risk management program is underway.

BUT IN TERMS OF THE U.S. FISCAL WELL BEING, ARE THE COSTS OF OUR CURRENT GWOT STRATEGY CAUSE FOR ALARM?

Federal expenditures are frequently expressed in terms of a percentage of our Gross Domestic Product (GDP)⁴¹. The 2005 GDP is projected to be just over \$12 trillion.⁴² Thus, doing the math, the 2005 DOD budget estimate of \$448 billion represents 3.73% of projected U.S. GDP, and the remaining \$39 billion for homeland security in the other federal agencies represents only about 1/3 of one percent (0.325%) of the projected U.S. GDP. The pending \$75 billion supplement to the DOD budget adds another 0.625%. Together, the total federal budget for all national defense equates to well less than 5% (4.68%) of the projected U.S. GDP for 2005. In comparison, during the Cold War, U.S. defense spending averaged nearly 7.5% of GDP annually between 1955 and 1990, with a high of 11% in 1955 to a low of 5% in 1980.⁴³

One can gain another perspective of the impact of defense budget on the overall American economy by viewing current defense spending in terms of the entire federal budget. Total federal spending has been remarkably stable at about 20% of GDP over the past 40 years, but the trend in defense outlays is part of a broader long-term trend in the federal budget, in which both defense and non-defense discretionary outlays have declined as shares of GDP

while mandatory outlays have increased, mostly for major “entitlement” programs. Between FY1962 and FY2004, mandatory outlays rose by 833% while defense outlays rose by only 30% in real terms. In FY1962, defense discretionary spending represented 49.2%, or almost half, of total federal outlays, while in FY2003 its share of total federal outlays declined to 18.8%. The share of federal outlays of mandatory programs increased from 26.1% in FY1962 to 54.1% in FY2004 and is projected to reach 56.5% by FY2009.⁴⁴

Viewed in another way, total federal outlays are projected to be \$2.4 trillion dollars in 2005⁴⁵. The \$487 billion budget for national defense, including homeland security, represents 20.3% of the total. The \$47 billion dedicated to homeland security represents less than 2% of total federal outlays. While \$47 billion is a lot of money, it is only a small fraction of total federal outlays, and a much smaller fraction of the GDP. If we are “bleeding,” 1/3 of one per cent of our GDP is no bankruptcy-causing hemorrhage. Given that the current budget for national defense represents just 4.68 % of GDP, we are still below the lowest Cold War defense spending levels.

There are yet other costs that America is incurring in its fight against terrorism. America's open and technologically complex society includes a wide array of critical infrastructure and key resources that are potential terrorist targets. The majority of these are owned and operated by the private sector and state or local governments. These critical infrastructures and key resources are both physical and cyber-based and span all sectors of the economy. The estimated costs to improve protection vary widely; however, as steps are taken to “harden” this infrastructure to withstand or recover from terrorist attack, the hardening costs will surely be passed on to consumers, or borne through tax relief or other means by government. Government must recoup those costs through higher taxes. State and local governments are also incurring additional costs through increases in law enforcement operations and improvements in emergency response capabilities.

However, according to the Congressional Budget Office, the U.S. GDP is projected to grow by 3.8% in 2005 and 3.7% in 2006, slowing to a pace of 2.9% during the period 2007-2015. Unemployment is projected to average 5.2%, and inflation is expected to average at 2.2% over the same period. Revenues are projected to surpass outlays by 2012. This projection takes into account the current trend in defense spending as well as the rising share of federal outlays attributed to mandatory spending (Medicare and Medicaid). “The increasing resources needed for such programs will exert pressure on the federal budget that will make current fiscal policy unsustainable.”⁴⁶ Thus, our economy is projected to remain full of vitality, capable of sustaining our current strategy well into the future. Any projected growth in defense

spending is not viewed as a threat to the fiscal well being of our country nearly as much as are our Congressionally mandated programs.

IS CURRENT GWOT FUNDING ADEQUATE, OR IS ADDITIONAL FUNDING NECESSARY?

The President's Budget Request for FY 2006 includes \$49.9 billion for homeland security activities, a \$3.9 billion (8.6%) increase over the 2005 level.⁴⁷ Increases are requested in five of the six critical mission areas, with a slight decrease requested for the Intelligence and Warning mission area.⁴⁸

Planning and conducting the attacks of 9/11 are estimated to have cost the perpetrators between \$400,000 and \$500,000.⁴⁹ Obviously, having the ability to plan and strike in an asymmetric manner has tremendous fiscal advantages. Defending the entire United States and its population requires exponentially larger expenditures. The National Strategy for Homeland Security acknowledges that it is only the beginning in a long struggle and that it "provides initial guidance to prioritize the work ahead."⁵⁰ In other words, there is more to be done. Development of universal standards as recommended by the GAO, and then the implementation of a process to (1) assess attainment of those standards and (2) determine what shortfalls exist will help provide a clearer vision of what work remains to adequately protect this country and its population from terrorism. One of the products of that process will be the identification of the means, which may or may not be additional funding, necessary to keep our strategy in balance. While "the justifications for action and spending seem limitless," "the allocation of funds should be based on an assessment of threats and vulnerabilities, based on such factors as population, population density, vulnerability, and the presence of critical infrastructure."⁵¹

It should be noted that current increases in homeland security budgets need not necessarily continue indefinitely. Much of the expense of what we are doing and what remains to be done, e.g., acquisition of new systems, establishing and achieving acceptable standards of emergency responder preparedness, and "hardening" of facilities, can be characterized as the initial price to attain the higher degree of security we seek. Once achieved, operational, training, exercises, and maintenance costs will continue, but total sustainment costs should be less than the initial build-up. Further, success across the spectrum of our strategies may eventually enable us to suspend or retire some of our efforts, just as we did the fall-out shelters and some of the Peacekeeper Missiles of the Cold War era. Ultimately, "success will only come through the sustained, steadfast, and systematic application of all the elements of national power – diplomatic, economic, information, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and

military.”⁵² “Victory in the War Against Terror” will be realized when “our children can live free from fear and where the threat of terrorist attacks does not define our daily lives.”⁵³

Should another attack occur (most feel it’s only a matter of when, not if), the estimated bill for dealing with the aftermath is not cheap. While the value of life and human suffering cannot be quantified, a study published by RAND in 2003, the direct adverse economic effects of a moderate, severe, and nuclear terrorist attack were estimated at \$11 billion, \$183 billion, and \$465 billion per year, respectively.⁵⁴ In March 2003, the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business published a study that estimated the direct economic losses of the 9/11 attacks at \$50 billion.⁵⁵ In 2002, the General Accounting Office estimated the 2002 fiscal year tax loss at about \$1.6 billion for New York City and \$1.6 billion for New York State. The estimates for fiscal year 2003 were \$1.4 billion and \$4.2 billion, respectively.⁵⁶

Last but not least, the United States should not bear a disproportionate share of waging this war, especially that portion being fought beyond our borders. As diplomatic efforts realize greater success in obtaining military and other contributions from our allies and other partners such as NATO, our need for future supplements to the defense budget to sustain GWOT operations should diminish.

CONCLUSION.

The intent of this paper has not been to advocate how or from where the federal government should obtain any additional funding needed for homeland security. The intent is to demonstrate that we have a sound, balanced strategy to deal with the terrorist threat, and that it is not causing our bankruptcy. As Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated in the Report of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, “This nation can afford to spend what is needed to deter the adversaries of tomorrow and to underpin our prosperity. Those costs do not begin to compare with the cost in human lives and resources if we fail to do so.”⁵⁷

Granted, the federal government is currently operating in a deficit – just as it did over almost the entire Cold War era, but we won the Cold War and also survived Cold War deficit spending, rebounding into the 21st century with a budget surplus. Renewed concern over the current deficit has prompted numerous studies and recommendations to overcome this dilemma. For example, a policy brief published by the Brookings Institute advocates both spending cuts and tax increases, coupled with a more fiscally responsible Congress.⁵⁸ This paper does not purport to offer any solutions to the national deficit; however, the projected growth of mandated entitlements such as Medicare and Medicaid, which far exceeds growth of defense spending, has a much greater potential for “bankrupting America” than does Osama bin

Laden. "In a free-for-all over money, it is understandable that representatives will work to protect the interests of their home states and districts. But hard choices must be made."⁵⁹ Hopefully, America and Congress will not regress back into complacency and these choices will not be forced upon us because of the impetus brought about by another disastrous attack.

By whatever the manner we regain government fiscal balance, we should not shy from appropriating the necessary resources to bring our homeland security strategies into the best balance possible. Protecting the U.S. and its citizens is a matter of most vital importance, worthy of proportionate effort and expense. In his introduction to the National Strategy for Homeland Security, President Bush stated, "The U.S. government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks."⁶⁰ This paper has given evidence that this government's current robust but prudent efforts to implement its GWOT strategies - for the protection of our homeland and to defeat terrorism - are certainly within our means.

WORD COUNT=5121

ENDNOTES

¹ George Friedman, "September 11: Three Years Later" Geopolitical Intelligence Report 9 September 2004; available from <<http://www.paulieworld.com/blog/archives/001150.html>>; Internet; accessed 23 October 2004.

² Google Search: Define: Sharia. "Sharia: Islamic law derived from three sources - the Quran, the Hadith, and the Sunnah. 'Path'; the whole body of Islamic law, which guides a Muslim's life." Accessed from <<http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&oi=defmore&q=define:Sharia>>; Internet; accessed 23 October 2004.

³ John Pike, "Al Qa'ida (The Base)/Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK – services office)/International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders/Osama bin Laden," 19 September 2001, updated 3 November 2004. Available from <<http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ladin.htm>>; Internet; accessed 10 December 2004.

⁴ Stephen Biddle, "War Aims and War Termination." 9. In *Defeating Terrorism*, ed. John R. Martin. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002).

⁵ Thomas H. Kean, and Lee H. Hamilton, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July, 2004), 362.

⁶ Department of State, *The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days*, 11. Available from <<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/6947.htm>>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2004.

⁷ Jim Turner, *Winning the War on Terror*. (Washington, D.C.: Select Committee on Homeland Security – Democratic Office, 27 April 2004), i.

⁸ Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), 18.

⁹ Washington University Law Quarterly (Washington University, Summer 1997). Posse Comitatus: In response to the military presence in the Southern States during the Reconstruction Era, Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act to prohibit the use of the Army in civilian law enforcement. The Act embodies the traditional American principle of separating civilian and military authority and currently forbids the use of the Army and Air Force to enforce civilian laws. Army Appropriations Act, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (1878) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994)). Available from <<http://law.wustl.edu/WULQ/75-2/752-10.html>>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2004.

¹⁰ U.S. Northcom | Who We Are – Mission, Available from http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.who_mission; Internet; accessed 4 March 2005.

¹¹ Department of Homeland Security, *Three Years of Progress in the War on Terror*. Available from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/print/20040911.html>; Internet; accessed 23 October 2004.

¹² Department of Homeland Security, *DHS Organization*. Available from <http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=9&content=2973>; Internet; accessed 14 December 2004.

¹³ Department of Homeland Security, *Budget in Brief*. Available from: http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/FY_2004_BUDGET_IN_BRIEF.pdf; Internet; accessed 23 October 2004.

¹⁴ Norman J. Rabkin, *Homeland Security: Observations on the National Strategies Related to Terrorism*. GAO-04-1075T report. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 22 September 2004), 11.

¹⁵ Tax Foundation, *The President's FY 2005 Budget in Perspective: Part II*, 4 February 2004, 1. Available from <<http://www.taxfoundation.org/ff/FY2005perspective2.html>>; Internet; accessed 23 Oct 04.

¹⁶ Michael O'Hanlon, *Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era*. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, February 2005), 15.

¹⁷ Rabkin, 6.

The Commission was also charged to "identify, review, and evaluate lessons learned from these attacks; and report to the President and Congress on findings, conclusions, and recommendations that generate from the investigation and review. The Commission's investigations were to focus on intelligence agencies; law enforcement agencies; diplomacy; immigration, nonimmigrant visas, and border control; the flow of assets to terrorist organizations; commercial aviation; the role of congressional oversight and resource allocation; and other areas of the public and private sectors determined to be relevant by the Commission for its inquiry.

¹⁸ Kean, 363.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, xvi.

²⁰ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002). The National Security strategy provides a broad framework for strengthening U.S. security in the future. It identifies the national security goals of the United States, describes the foreign policy and military capabilities necessary to achieve those goals, evaluates the current status of these capabilities, and explains how national power will be structured to utilize these capabilities. It devotes a chapter to combating terrorism that focuses on the disruption and destruction of terrorist organizations, the winning of the "war of ideas," the strengthening of homeland security, and the fostering of cooperation with allies and international organizations to combat terrorism.

²¹ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. (Washington, D.C.: Office of Homeland Security, The White House, July 2002). vii-x. The Homeland Security strategy addresses the threat of terrorism in the United States by organizing the domestic efforts of federal, state, local, and private organizations. It aligns and focuses homeland security functions into six critical mission areas, set forth as (1) intelligence and warning, (2) border and transportation security, (3) domestic counterterrorism, (4) protecting critical infrastructure and

key assets, (5) defending against catastrophic threats, and (6) emergency preparedness and response. Additionally, it describes four foundations that cut across all the mission areas, across all levels of government, and across all sectors of society as being (1) law, (2) science and technology, (3) information sharing and systems, and (4) international cooperation. It also addresses the costs of homeland security and future priorities.

²² Ibid., 2-3.

²³ Ibid., 2.

²⁴ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Executive Office of the President, February 2003), 11-28. The Combating Terrorism strategy elaborates on the terrorism aspects of the National Security strategy by expounding on the need to destroy terrorist organizations, win the “war of ideas,” and strengthen security at home and abroad. Unlike the Homeland Security strategy that focuses on preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, the Combating Terrorism strategy focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach the borders of the United States. In that sense, although it has defensive elements, this strategy is an offensive strategy to complement the defensive Homeland Security strategy.

The stated intent of The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is to “stop attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and our friends and allies around the world and ultimately, to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them,” the strategy is designed to “simultaneously act on four fronts:

(1) Defeating terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. Defeating terrorist organizations includes identifying, locating and destroying terrorists and their organizations through the direct and indirect use of diplomatic, economic, information, law enforcement, military, financial, intelligence, and other instruments of power, using all resources of the United States and its partners.

(2) Denying further sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists by ensuring other states accept (compelling them if necessary) their responsibilities to take action against these international threats within their sovereign territory. Denying sponsorship, support and sanctuary involves the termination of state sponsorship of terrorism, establishing and maintaining an international standard of accountability with regard to combating terrorism, strengthening and sustaining the international effort to fight terrorism, interdicting and disrupting material support for terrorists, and eliminating terrorist sanctions and havens.

(3) Diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on the areas most at risk. To diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit the U.S. will partner the international community, strengthening weak states and preventing the (re) emergence of terrorism, and winning the (information) war of ideas.

(4) Defending the United States, our citizens, and our interests at home and abroad by both proactively protecting our homeland and extending our defenses to ensure we identify and neutralize the threat as early as possible. Defending U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad includes implementing the National Strategy for Homeland Security, attaining awareness

of all threatening activities, events, and trends within any specified domain (air, land, sea, cyber), enhancing measures to ensure the integrity, reliability, and availability of physical and information-based infrastructures at home and abroad, integrating measures to protect U.S. citizens abroad, and ensuring an integrated incident management capability to mitigate the effects of an attack.

²⁵ George W. Bush, *The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*. (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 11 December 2002), 1. The Weapons of Mass Destruction strategy presents a national strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through three major efforts: (1) nonproliferation, (2) counterproliferation, and (3) consequence management in WMD incidents. The plan addresses the production and proliferation of WMD among nations, as well as the potential threat of terrorists using WMD agents.

²⁶ George W. Bush, *The National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets*. (Washington, D.C.: The White house, February 2003), vii. The Physical Infrastructure strategy provides a statement of national policy to remain committed to protecting critical infrastructures and key assets from terrorist attacks and is based on eight guiding principles, including establishing responsibility and accountability, encouraging and facilitating partnering among all levels of government and between government and industry, and encouraging market solutions wherever possible and government intervention when needed. The strategy also establishes three strategic objectives. The first is to identify and assure the protection of the most critical assets, systems, and functions, in terms of national level public health and safety, governance, and economic and national security and public confidence. The second is to ensure protection of infrastructures and assets facing specific, imminent threats. The third is to pursue collaborative measures and initiatives to ensure the protection of other potential targets that may become attractive over time.

²⁷ George W. Bush, *The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace*. (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003), viii. The Secure Cyberspace strategy is intended to provide an initial framework for both organizing and prioritizing efforts to protect our nation's cyberspace. Also, it is to provide direction to federal departments and agencies that have roles in cyberspace security and to identify steps that state and local governments, private companies and organizations, and individual Americans can take to improve the nation's collective cybersecurity. In describing the threats to, and vulnerabilities of, our nation's cyberspace, the strategy highlights the potential for damage to U.S. information systems from attacks by terrorist organizations.

²⁸ Paul H. O'Neill & John Ashcroft. *2002 National Money Laundering Strategy*. (Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 2002), 4. The Money Laundering strategy is intended to support planning for the efforts of law enforcement agencies, regulatory officials, the private sector, and overseas entities to combat the laundering of money generated from criminal activities. The overriding goal of the *2002 Strategy* is to deny terrorist groups access to the international financial system, to impair the ability of terrorists to raise funds, and to expose, isolate, and incapacitate the financial networks of terrorists. The lessons learned from our previous undertakings against money laundering must now be applied to attack the scourge of terrorism and to deny terrorist groups the ability to finance their acts of cold-blooded murder. By aggressively pursuing the money trails left by all criminals and terrorists, law enforcement can identify and capture those involved and can deny terrorist entities the funds necessary to finance further acts of terror.

²⁹ Randall A. Yim, *Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism*. GAO-04-408T report. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 3 February 2004). 5.

³⁰ Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy." In *U.S. Army War College guide to Strategy*, eds. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001), Chapter 13, 179-183.

³¹ H. Richard Yarger, *Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army College Strategy Model*, 7. Database on-line. Available from <<http://dde.carlisle.army.mil/authors/stratpap.htm>>; Internet; accessed 2 September 2004.

³² U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy. Appendix I, "Guidelines for Strategy Formulation." In *Directive – Course 2: War, National Security Policy, and Strategy*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA.: U.S. Army War College, 2004), 160. A vital interest is one, which, if unfulfilled, will have immediate consequences for core national interests.

³³ Rabkin, 9.

³⁴ Ibid., 14.

³⁵ Ibid., 14-15.

³⁶ William O. Jenkins, Jr., *Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning Needed to Better Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region*. GAO-04-904T report. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 24 June 2004), 5.

³⁷ Randall A. Yim, *Homeland Security Selected Recommendations from Congressionally Chartered Commissions and GAO*. GAO-04-591 report. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 31 March 2004), 1. In addition to the 9/11 Commission, Congress chartered three other commissions between 1999 and 2000 to examine terrorist threats and the government's response to such threats, as well as to make recommendations to federal, state, local, and private sector organizations. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) has also conducted several evaluations of various homeland security programs. The Congressionally chartered national commissions included the Bremer Commission (also known as the National Commission on Terrorism, chaired by Ambassador Paul Bremer), the Gilmore Commission (also known as the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired by Governor James S. Gilmore, III), and the Hart- Rudman Commission (also known as the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman)

³⁸ Jenkins, 3-4

³⁹ The Whitehouse, Office of Management and Budget, *Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005*. (Washington, D.C., US Government Printing Office, 2004), 5.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 33.

⁴¹ USA Today, *Gross Domestic Product*: "The measure of the USA's output of goods and services is calculated by the Commerce Department using the following items:

Personal consumption

Government expenditures

Private investment

Inventory growth

Trade balance"

Available from <<http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/econ0025.htm>>; Internet; accessed 14 December 2004.

⁴² Tax Foundation, 1.

⁴³ Kevin Lapidus, "National Security at What Price? The Economic Consequences of Military Spending." *American Economist* 37 (Fall 1993), 69. Database on-line. Available from FirstSearch. Internet, accessed 22 September 2004.

⁴⁴ Jeffrey Chamberlain, *FY2005 Defense Budget: Frequently Asked Questions*. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 12 July 2004), 12-14.

"Budget Authority, Obligations, and Outlays. When Congress appropriates money, it provides agencies with "budget authority." Budget authority gives an agency the legal authority to obligate money for the provision of goods or services. Appropriations are the most common, but not the only, type of budget authority. Obligations then occur, for example, when agencies enter into contracts, submit purchase orders, and employ personnel. When those obligations are liquidated — or in simpler terms, when the "check is written" and the performance of an obligation is paid for — outlays occur. The term "defense spending" technically refers to outlays, although budget authority and outlays are frequently confused in budget discussions.

Discretionary and Mandatory Spending. Within the federal budget, budget authority is classified as either discretionary or mandatory. Generally, budget authority is discretionary if provided by Congress in appropriations acts and mandatory if provided in permanent authorizing law (examples include Social Security, Medicare, and federal employee retirement). However, a portion of mandatory budget authority, including Medicaid and certain veterans' programs, is funded in annual appropriations acts. Discretionary budget authority must be renewed annually, while most mandatory budget authority is available automatically each year without legislative action by Congress. Outlays are also classified as discretionary or mandatory according to the classification of the budget authority from which they flow."

⁴⁵ The White House, Office of Management and Budget, *Historical Tables: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 76.

⁴⁶ Congressional Budget Office, *The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), xvi.

⁴⁷ The White House, Office of Management and Budget. *Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2006*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), 37.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 39.

⁴⁹ Kean, 169.

⁵⁰ Bush, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, vii.

⁵¹ Kean, 364.

⁵² Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 29.

⁵³ Ibid., 12.

⁵⁴ Benjamin Zycher, *A Preliminary Benefit/Cost Framework for Counterterrorism Public Expenditures*. (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2003), ix.

⁵⁵ Steven J. Davis, Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel. *War in Iraq versus Containment: Weighing the Costs*. (Chicago, 20 March 2003), 17.

⁵⁶ Nancy R. Kingsbury, *Review of the Estimates for the Impact of the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks on New York Tax Revenues*. GAO-02-882R report. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 26 July 2002), 2.

⁵⁷ Rumsfeld, vi.

⁵⁸ Alice M. Rivlin and Isabell V. Sawhill, *How to Balance the Budget*. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, March 2004), 1.

⁵⁹ Kean, 396.

⁶⁰ Bush, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, 1.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Biddle, Stephen. "War Aims and War Termination." In *Defeating Terrorism*, ed. John R. Martin. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002.
- Bush, George W. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Executive Office of the President, February 2003.
- Bush, George W. *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. Washington, D.C.: Office of Homeland Security, The White House, July 2002.
- Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002.
- Bush, George W. *The National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets*. Washington, D.C.: The White house, February 2003.
- Bush, George W. *The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 11 December 2002.
- Bush, George W. *The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003.
- Chamberlain, Jeffrey. *FY2005 Defense Budget: Frequently Asked Questions*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 12 July 2004.
- Davis, Steven J., Kevin M. Murphy, and Robert H. Topel. "War in Iraq versus Containment: Weighing the Costs." 20 March 2003. Available from <<http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/steven.davis/research>>. Internet. Accessed 23 October 2004.
- Friedman, George. *September 11: Three Years Later*. Geopolitical Intelligence Report. 9 September 2004. Available from <<http://www.paulieworld.com/blog/archives/001150.html>>. Internet. Accessed 23 October 2004.
- Google Search: Define: Sharia. "Sharia: Islamic law derived from three sources - the Quran, the Hadith, and the Sunnah. 'Path'; the whole body of Islamic law, which guides a Muslim's life." Accessed from <<http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&oi=defmore&q=define:Sharia>>. Internet. Accessed 23 October 2004.
- Jenkins, William O., Jr. *Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning Needed to Better Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region*. GAO-04-904T report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 24 June 2004.
- Kean, Thomas H., and Lee H. Hamilton. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2004.
- Kingsbury, Nancy R. *Review of the Estimates for the Impact of the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks on New York Tax Revenues*. GAO-02-882R report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 26 July 2002.

Lapidus, Kevin. "National Security at What Price? The Economic Consequences of Military Spending." *American Economist* 37 (Fall 1993). Database on-line. Available from FirstSearch. Accessed 22 September 2004.

Lykke, Arthur F., Jr. "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy." In *U.S. Army War College guide to Strategy*, eds. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001.

O'Hanlon, Michael. *Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, February 2005.

O'Neill, Paul H., and John Ashcroft. *2002 National Money Laundering Strategy*. Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 2002.

Pike, John. "Al Qa'ida (The Base)/Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK – services office)/International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders/Osama bin Laden." 19 September 2001, updated 3 November 2004: Available from <<http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ladin.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 10 December 2004.

Rabkin, Norman J. *Homeland Security: Observations on the National Strategies Related to Terrorism*. GAO-04-1075T report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 22 September 2004.

Rivlin, Alice M., and Isabell V. Sawhill. *How to Balance the Budget*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, March 2004.

Rumsfeld, Donald H. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 30 September 2001.

Tax Foundation. *The President's FY 2005 Budget in Perspective: Part II*. 4 February 2004. Available from <<http://www.taxfoundation.org/ff/FY2005perspective2.html>>. Internet. Accessed 23 October 04.

The White House, Office of Management and Budget. *Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005*. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2004.

The White House, Office of Management and Budget. *Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2006*. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2005.

The White House, Office of Management and Budget. *Historical Tables: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004.

Turner, Jim. *Winning the War on Terror*. Washington, D.C.: Select Committee on Homeland Security – Democratic Office, 27 April 2004.

U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy. Appendix I, "Guidelines for Strategy Formulation." In *Directive – Course 2: War, National Security Policy, and Strategy*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004.

U.S. Congressional Budget Office. *The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015*. Washington, D.C. 2005.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *Budget in Brief*. Available from <http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/FY_2004_BUDGET_IN_BRIEF.pdf>. Internet. Accessed 23 October 2004.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *DHS Organization*. Available from <<http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=9&content=2973>>. Internet. Accessed 14 December 2004.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *Three Years of Progress in the War on Terror*. Available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/print/20040911.html>>. Internet. Accessed 23 October 2004.

U.S. Department of State. *The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days*. Available from <<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/6947.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 17 December 2004.

U.S. Northern Command. *U.S. Northcom | Who We Are – Mission*. Available from <http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.who_mission>. Internet. Accessed 4 March 2005.

USA Today. Available from <<http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/econ0025.htm>>; Internet. Accessed 14 December 2004.

Washington University Law Quarterly Summer 1997. Available from <<http://law.wustl.edu/WULQ/75-2/752-10.html>>; Internet. Accessed 17 December 2004.

Yarger, H. Richard. *Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army College Strategy Model*. Database on-line. Available from <<http://dde.carlisle.army.mil/authors/stratpap.htm>> Accessed 2 September 2004.

Yim, Randall A. *Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism*. GAO-04-408T report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 3 February 2004.

Yim, Randall A. *Homeland Security Selected Recommendations from Congressionally Chartered Commissions and GAO*. GAO-04-591 report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 31 March 2004.

Zycher, Benjamin. *A Preliminary Benefit/Cost Framework for Counterterrorism Public Expenditures*. Arlington, VA: RAND, 2003.

